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Models of cooperation grounded on social networks and on the ability of individuals to choose
actions and partners aim to describe human social behavior. Extensive computer simulations of
these models give important insight in the social mechanisms behind emerging collective behavior.
We consider the entangled co-evolution of actions and social structure in a new version of a spatial
Prisoner’s Dilemma model that naturally gives way to a process of social differentiation. Diverse
social roles emerge from the dynamics of the system: leaders -individuals getting a large payoff
who are imitated by a considerable fraction of the population-, conformists -unsatisfied cooperative
agents that keep cooperating-, and exploiters -Defectors with a payoff larger than the average one
obtained by Cooperators. The dynamics generates a social network that can have the topology of a
small world network. The network has a strong hierarchical structure in which the leaders play an
essential role sustaining a highly cooperative stable regime. The social structure is shown to be very
sensitive to perturbations acting on the leaders. Such perturbations produce social crisis described
as dynamical cascades that propagate through the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social traps (Platt 1973) are situations in which ra-
tional individual choices result in an undesirable collec-
tive outcome for the social group. A well known exam-
ple is the problem of establishing cooperation in a so-
cial group (Axelrod 1994) or, more generally, problems
of public goods (Olson 1965, Hardin 1968). It is often
recognized that the understanding of collective social be-
havior, once individual attitudes are known, requires tak-
ing into account the interactions among the individuals
of the group, and that these are mediated by a network
of social relations (Granovetter 1973, 1978). Such net-
work constitutes the social structure of the group. The
embeddedness of the interactions in the social structure
(Granovetter 1985) has been identified as a main ingredi-
ent in explaining the evolution of cooperation (Macy and
Skvoretz 1998). It is also well documented (Lazer 2001),
that in the same way that the actions of the individuals
are affected by the social network, the network is not an
exogenous structure, but it is rather created by individ-
ual choices. However, there are not many specific models
of social dynamics that incorporate explicitly the concept
of co-evolution of individual and network (Lazer 2001).
In fact, in the long term research agenda posed by Macy
(1991) a central point is that the structure of the network
should not be considered as given, but as a variable. The
question posed is ...to explore how social structure might
evolve in tandem with the collective action it makes pos-
sible. This goes further beyond models in which there is
some network evolution decoupled from the evolution of
the actions of the individuals in the group. In the context
of reciprocal altruism and the building of cooperation,
this general question was implicitly considered within a
game theory simulation model named the Social Evolu-
tion Model (SEM) (de Vos et al., 2001; Zeggelink et al.,
2000). In this paper we address explicitly the problem
of co-evolution in a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) (Rapoport and Chammah 1965) in which players
interact through a network that adapts to the results of
the game, and therefore to the actions of the players.
We focus on the resulting type of social structure (co-
hesive group versus social hierarchy), as well as on the
dynamical mechanisms needed to produce the topologi-
cal properties of the network of interactions that stabilize
a collective cooperative behavior.
A main result of our analysis, extensively based on
computer simulations (Zimmermann et al. 2001), is the
emergence of a process of social differentiation together
with the building-up of a network with hierarchical rela-
tions. Starting from random partnership among equiv-
alent individuals, a social structure emerges. In this
emerging structure, the topology of the network of social
relations identifies individual with different social roles:
leaders, conformists and exploiters. These roles have
been spontaneously selected during the complex adap-
tive evolution of the social group that entails a learning
process. This social structure sustains global coopera-
tion with exploiters surviving in hierarchical chains in
the network. This result is at variance with other sim-
ulation models, such as SEM, in which partner selection
leads to the formation of cohesive egalitarian clusters
(de Vos et al., 2001; Zeggelink et al., 2000): the emer-
gence of these groups in a socially segmented population,
with exclusion of free riders, seems to be the basis of the
survival of cooperation in these other studies. Concern-
ing the topology of the co-evolved network that sustains
cooperation, we find a hierarchical network with an expo-
nential connectivity distribution. Our results show that
clustering is not needed to sustain cooperation. However
the additional inclusion of local neighboring partner se-
lection in the model generates the celebrated small-world
connectivity (Watts 1999) of the network.
From a philosophical point of view, the concept of
2emergence is used in contemporary sociology in con-
tradictory ways, being its proper meaning debatable
(Sawyer 2001). We use it here as it appears in multi-
agent models of social systems (Gilbert and Conte 1965;
Schelling 1978; Epstein and Axtell 1996; Axelrod 1997).
In this context it refers, as often also used in the natu-
ral sciences, to complex dynamical behavior or properties
that cannot be reduced to, or predicted from a detailed
description of the units that compose a system, so that
the reductionist hypothesis does not imply a construc-
tionist one (Anderson 1972). These ideas put forward a
hierarchical structure of science in which different con-
cepts and descriptions are needed at different levels. The
key idea is that sociology cannot be reduced to psychol-
ogy, as molecular biology is not just applied chemistry
(Anderson 1972). From this perspective, and recogniz-
ing the limitations of game theory in describing human
interactions, we learn much from a metaphor like the
Prisoner’s Dilemma when considering emergent proper-
ties which are not simply linked to special features of
individual human behavior.
A canonical example of emergence is the V shape of
bird flocks (Sawyer 2001). The shape of the flock and
the fact that a particular bird plays the role of a leader,
with other birds lining up behind it, is a nontrivial result
of simple interaction rules, but the leader is neither genet-
ically determined nor externally appointed. Our results
parallel this example, showing how equivalent agents con-
fronted with the choice of an action (cooperating or de-
fecting) and with the possibility of choosing partners,
differentiate and acquire different roles while building up
a social structure. This process is the result of interac-
tions among neighbors that determine an entangled co-
evolution of the choice of actions and of the social net-
work. A particular enlightening example of the general
process that we address here is the cooperative relations
among researchers in a given scientific field. A given re-
searcher might choose to work or not to work together
with other scientist and, depending on the degree of suc-
cess of this collaboration, he might search in the commu-
nity to find other scientists with which a profitable co-
operative relation can be alternatively established. This
co-evolution process results in a network of collaborations
in which different scientists play different roles.
Our results might be compared with other studies of
group formation beyond those associated with the SEM.
In the theory of group stability of Carley (1991), as it
also happens in our simple model of equivalent agents,
individuals assume multiple roles. Also there, these di-
verse roles produce, at the group level, group stability
or change depending on the social structure. However,
while the theory of Carley is based on sharing of knowl-
edge, this aspect is missing in our model. Stability is in
our case strictly dependent on the adapting structure of
the network of interactions.
In the remainder of this introduction we give a brief
discussion of the main ingredients of our analysis. These
ingredients are models of cooperation, models of social
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FIG. 1: (a) At time step t, the system is composed by Cooper-
ators (white circles a - e) and Defectors (black circle f) whose
interactions are given by the links. Given that the payoff ma-
trix is given by P = S = 0, R = 1 and T = 1.3, the payoff
for each agent is {Πa,Πb,Πc,Πd,Πe,Πf} = {1, 2, 3, 2, 2, 2.6}.
Therefore the Cooperator c is the leader, because it has the
maximum payoff. Agents a and b get a lower payoff than their
common neighbor, the Defector f . However, agent a has an-
other neighbor c who gets an even larger payoff than f . (b)
In the next time step t + 1, a imitates Cooperation from c,
which has the largest payoff among its neighbors, and only
agent b changes strategy and imitates the D-strategy from f .
The figure also shows that b broke the link with agent f and
starts a new interaction with the randomly selected agent a.
networks, and the implications of the will of the agents
that manifests itself in the ability of making choices. The
second section of the paper presents our model and some
general conclusions from its analysis. The main body
of our computer simulation results are summarized in
Section 3. We conclude with a discussion of results and
limitations of our study.
A. Routes to cooperation
Why do people cooperate? Why cooperation is em-
pirically observed when there is a conflict between the
self-interest and the common good? Classical answers to
these questions are formulated in terms of kin (Hamilton
1964) or group selection (Wilson and Sober 1994), or co-
operation based upon reciprocity (Trivers 1971, Axelrod
and Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984). The first answers are
biologically inspired on the increased biological fitness of
kinship or on the adaptive success of groups of Cooper-
ators. Still, the idea of social kin selection has been put
forward (Riolo et al. 2001): cooperation can arise from
similarity, and tags that identify such similarity can be
based in cultural attributes instead of being genetically
determined. Indeed, cultural transmission has been in-
voked as a potential reason for the prevalence of coop-
eration in human populations (Mark 2002). Other route
to cooperation, based on a reputation score for each in-
dividual and information sharing (Nowak and Sigmund
1998), also emphasizes the cultural forces present in hu-
man society. Cooperation grounded on reputation can
be seen however, as a form of indirect reciprocity.
Cooperation based upon reciprocity is often formalized
3through the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport and
Chammah 1965). The game theoretical formulation of
the PD shows that two perfectly rational agents interact-
ing once, and confronted with the choice of cooperating
or defecting, would both choose to defect, which corre-
sponds to the Nash equilibrium of the game. When the
game is repeated or iterated, the Folk theorem classifies
the many possible outcomes that can be sustained, in
particular full cooperation. It is the shadow of the future
in the repeated interaction that makes cooperation sus-
tainable (Axelrod 1984). Although basic concepts and
results on the PD were well known in game theory (Bin-
more 1998), the evolutionary ideas for the selection of an
equilibrium pioneered by Axelrod (1984, 1997) have been
extremely influential. They have lead to the considera-
tion of the virtue of different strategies and to the concept
of evolutionary stable strategies. It is now well accepted
that dynamical models of cultural evolution and social
learning hold a greater chance for success than models
merely based on rational choice. This body of knowl-
edge has been reviewed by Hoffmann (2000), while some
recent advances in the theory have been reviewed by Ax-
elrod (2000).
Generally speaking, the ingredient of locality is not
taken into account in the different studies of models of
cooperation mentioned so far. Individuals or players in-
teract globally by continuous changes of random pairings
among them. However, local spatial interactions intro-
duce another possibility of reciprocity which is not based
on history dependent or backward-looking strategies. In
this line of thinking, spatial PD games have been intro-
duced (Axelrod 1984, Nowak and May 1992), and fur-
ther generalized by Lindgren and Nordahl (1994). Spa-
tial games and local interactions were also introduced in
economic contexts by Blume (1993) and Ellison (1993).
Nowak and May (1992, 1993) and Nowak et al. (1994a,
1994b) start considering a group of individuals placed
at the nodes of a regular two dimensional square lattice.
What they showed is that cooperation might arise from
spatially distributed interactions: if agents play only with
a local neighborhood in the lattice, clusters of Coopera-
tors may survive the interaction with Defectors, and co-
operation may be sustained. This can happen bypassing
any consideration on memory and strategies, in situations
in which non-cooperative behavior would prevail in the
global game. Admittedly, the game theory formulation
of cooperation neglects interpersonal relations driven by
emotional processes (Lawler and Yoon 1998). In spatial
PD games, the fundamental relationship is that of ex-
change conditioned by structural position. Still, the basic
mechanism of imitation of successful neighbors is intro-
duced. This mechanism is certainly prevalent in many
human interactions. We finally mention that the anal-
ysis of spatial games, specially when searching for col-
lective emergent behavior in societies with a large num-
ber of individuals, require the use of intensive computer
simulations. There are however some analytical results
(Schweitzer 2002), specially in simplified one-dimensional
models (Eshel et al. 1998).
There are other routes to cooperation, among which we
can mention optional participation (Hauert et al. 2002),
and stochastic collusion (Macy 1991). Optional or volun-
teering participation is a mechanism that incorporates, in
addition of Cooperators and Defectors, players (loners)
that refuse to participate in the game. This has been
shown to be an effective mechanism to escape from the
social dilemma without invoking any form of reciprocity.
Incorporating locality and spatial interactions, Cooper-
ators also tend to fare better (Szabo and Hauert 2002).
Stochastic collusion stems from a forward-looking route
to learning and adaptive behavior (Macy and Flache
2002): stochastic search by adaptive individuals in re-
sponse to immediate outcomes allows escaping from the
non-cooperative social trap. The beneficial implications
of locality (bounded social space) to sustain cooperation
have also been discussed for this mechanism (Macy 1991).
B. Social networks
A new field of opportunities for modeling is opened
when considering the network of social interactions - links
between individuals are not established in a random way,
but depending on neighborhood or interest relationships.
As a consequence, clusters and stable linkage are devel-
oped giving way to new aspects of cooperation in which
interactions among individuals have an important effect,
being crucial to the performance of the system as a whole
(Holland et al 1986).
The consideration of the spatial version of the PD dis-
cussed above is a step in the direction of considering a
social network. But a social network is in general dif-
ferent from a regular two dimensional lattice, as much as
social interactions are different from a continuous random
pairing of individuals. The popular phenomenon of six
degrees of separation (Guare 1990), that follows from the
early experiments of Milgram (1967), makes clear that if
the average separation between two individuals is given
by only six intermediate acquaintances (six links), social
networks radically differ from the regular ones often con-
sidered in spatial games. Such small world effect has been
re-popularized by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Beyond
the physical and topological properties of the network,
it is also important to recall that, in economic terms, a
social network has been associated with a social capital
(Coleman 1988), in the sense that it gives the basis for
stable repeated social interactions.
The spatial version of the PD has been revisited by Ax-
elrod and coworkers (Axelrod et al. 2000, Cohen et al.
2001) trying to understand the role of social structure
and geographically based networks in the maintenance
of cooperation. They have shown that geographically
dispersed social networks are efficient in maintaining co-
operation, provided the links are stable. They conclude
therefore that the important ingredient is not clustering
(i.e., locality or correlation of linkage patterns), but what
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FIG. 2: Imitation network obtained from a numerical simu-
lation with T = 1.75, R = 1, P = S = 0 and p = 0.10. The
simulation starts from a random network with N = 10000
agents and a number K = 8 of average links per node of the
network. Agents are organized in imitation layers coded with
the same grey level. Starting from the outer layer of a tree,
new nodes are introduced for each new link in the path to
reach the leader at the top of the tree. Each agent imitates
the agent of the inner layer to whom it is linked in the tree.
The network contains several trees. Three leaders (L0, L1 and
L2) are identified. L0 is the absolute leader with the largest
payoff in the system. Its tree contains approximately half the
number of agents of the system. All nodes are Cooperators,
because Defectors are isolated in the imitation network. Most
of the network’s nodes, which belong to the lowest layer of the
hierarchical structure, are not shown for clarity.
they label as context preservation, that is the continuity
of interactions. Another interesting contribution in this
context is the study of Buskens and Weesie (2000) on the
role of social structure in supporting cooperation via rep-
utation. By including a social structure, this study goes
beyond the ones of Nowak and May (1998) and Riolo et
al. (2001) and it shows (Axelrod 2000) that these two
aspects, social structure and reputation, reinforce each
other in building up a cooperative collective behavior.
Reputation established via information sharing leads to
sustained cooperation in social structures that are less
rigid than the ones fixed by geographic positions, adding
therefore a higher degree of freedom.
From the early mathematical analysis of random net-
works (Erdos and Renyi, 1959) there is a fast growing lit-
erature devoted to uncovering the topological properties
of technological, biological and social networks (Wasser-
man and Faust 1984, Watts and Strogatz 1998, Watts
1999, Watts 1999b, Barabasi and Albert 1999, Amaral
et al. 2000, Newman 2001, Newman and Strogatz 2001),
partially reviewed by Albert and Barabasi (2002) and
Barabasi (2002). Strogatz (2001) emphasized that, de-
spite their different nature, many networks present simi-
lar characteristics, but it is important to note that differ-
ences do also exist. The main properties of a network
usually analyzed are average distance between nodes,
clustering and degree distribution. A short average dis-
tance, that is, the fact that the number of steps needed
to connect any pair of individuals in a social network is
small, is what originally characterizes a small world ef-
fect. But it was long ago recognized (Wasserman and
Faust 1984) that social networks also show a high ten-
dency to form cliques, i.e., friends of friends are also
friends. Such high clustering property and a small path
length characterize the small world networks formalized
by Watts (1999). These small world networks are half-
way between random and regular networks. The degree
distribution is the probability distribution of the number
of links or connections of a node of the network. Many
networks have a power law distribution, which implies
a scale free distribution of degree (Barabasi and Albert
1999). However, it has been reported (Amaral et al.
2000) that social networks do not generally display such
heterogeneity in their connectivity, but instead show a
more homogeneous degree distribution, with the number
of connections being characterized by a narrow distribu-
tion around a single scale.
Our concern in this paper is not the characterization
of the topological properties obtained considering a snap-
shot of a social network. Rather, the question addressed
is how the network is dynamically formed or how a given
network structure is reached after social agents interact
for a long time (Zimmermann et al. 2004). As Watts in-
dicates (Watts 1999), networks affect the dynamics of the
system in a passive and an active way. Examples of the
passive way are the spatial version of the PD game and
the variants thereof previously mentioned, or the study
of a PD game in small world network (Abramson and
Kuperman 2001). We are here interested in the active
aspect in which the network of connections evolves by
the will of the agents. We seek to unveil possible dynam-
ical mechanisms to achieve a small world connectivity.
C. Making choices and beyond: Spontaneous social
differentiation
Incorporating the will of the agents seems to be a cru-
cial ingredient in any model of human behavior. In the
setting of a spatial version of the PD game in a social net-
work, the agents should have some way of choosing their
actions (cooperate or defect) and choosing their partners.
Making choices is an instrument for learning in an adap-
tive evolution.
Partner and action selection has been taken into ac-
count in the iterated PD as reviewed by de Vos et al.
(2001), but without considering local spatial interactions
and also without reference to a social network. The vol-
unteering mechanism of Hauert et al. (2002) does not
give a choice of action, since agents refusing to participate
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FIG. 3: Average fraction of cooperative agents, fC , for differ-
ent values of the plasticity p and incentive to defect, b. For a
fixed network (p = 0), fC decreases with b. However in the
presence of social plasticity (p 6= 0) fC is kept above 90%.
are fixed from the outset, but it is an indirect mechanism
to determine who interacts with whom. More closely re-
lated to changes in the network structure, or to the choice
of partners, is allowing players to exit from an unsatis-
factory relationship with partners, as discussed by Axel-
rod (2000) on the grounds of the Edk-Group’s analysis
of a set of fifteen strategies related with the possibility
of opting out (Edk-Group 2000). The possibility of exit-
ing generally reinforces cooperation, but again this study
does not include local interactions and social networks.
The formation of a social network based on individ-
ual decisions has been studied by Bala and Goyal (2000),
but differently of our interest here, the individuals form-
ing the network do not have some dynamics on top of
the network of interactions: there is no game mediated
by the interactions defined by the network. Skyrms and
Pemantle (2000) do consider the simultaneous evolution
of actions and structure of the network (fluid network),
emphasizing that these type of models are largely unex-
plored. A generic result from their study is that impor-
tant changes of global behavior occur when moving from
frozen to fluid social networks. Their approach is simi-
lar to the one also considered by Macy (1991): Starting
from a random network, the network is regenerated at
each time step of the game by random pairings among
the agents, but the probabilities of a pairing depend on
the previous results of the game. This a basic idea of
co-evolution, but it does not take into account aspects
of locality, or a social network, that albeit evolving, has
well established stable links among individuals.
Our starting point is the observation that the influ-
ence of social structure in human behavior, with feed-
back between actions and social structure, might be seen
as an entangled co-evolution of the choice of actions and
the formation of a social structure. Specifically, we ad-
dress here the issue of the evolution of social networks
in the context of cooperation, allowing individuals both
to choose actions and to choose exiting from unsatisfac-
tory relationships. We propose a simple model where
the actions of individuals that form the social network
are driven by their level of satisfaction, choosing their
actions by imitation of their best neighbor. Moreover,
we introduce social plasticity –other definitions are intro-
duced by Lazer (2001)– as the capacity of the individuals
to choose partners, being able to change their neighbor-
hood as time goes on. Evolving interactions, thus, ap-
pear, allowing individuals to choose different partners on
the grounds of the obtained performance.
The significant step forward in the results of our ap-
proach is that it naturally leads to a process of social
differentiation. Starting from random partnership among
equivalent individuals, a social structure emerges. In this
emerging structure the topology of the network of social
relations identifies individuals with different social roles.
These roles have been spontaneously selected during the
complex adaptive dynamics of the social group. They are
not the direct consequence of initial differences in strat-
egy or location. Rather they emerge in a probabilistic
dynamics in which the social network is constructed.
II. PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN AN ADAPTIVE
NETWORK
The simplest form of the PD game consists of two
agents which may choose from either of two actions: to
cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If both agents choose C,
each agent gets a payoff (reward) R; if one defects while
the other cooperates, the former gets a payoff T (with
T > R), while the latter gets the ”suckers” payoff S
(with S < R); if both defect, both get a payoff P . Under
the standard restrictions T > R > P > S, T + P < 2R,
defection is the best choice in a single shot game (Nash
equilibrium). Thus the social dilemma of how cooper-
ation may be sustained arises, due to the fact that ra-
tional agents would defect. When no social structure is
assumed, agents are drawn randomly in pairs to play the
game, and the dynamics may be described by a replica-
tor type equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). This
equation can be understood from the biologically mo-
tivated fact that strategies with fitness larger than the
average in the whole population, replicate with a posi-
tive rate, while those that underperform the average, die
away. In our context, if ΠC is the average payoff obtained
using strategy C, and 〈Π〉 is the average payoff for all the
population, then the time evolution of the fraction of the
agents using strategy C, labeled fC , obeys the equation
dfC
dt
= fC(ΠC − 〈Π〉) . (1)
Given the payoffs of the PD game we obtain
ΠC = RfC + (1− fC)S (2)
〈Π〉 = Rf2C + (S + T )fC(1− fC) + P (1− fC)
2 , (3)
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FIG. 4: Difference between the average payoff of Defectors,
〈ΠD〉, and Cooperators, 〈ΠC〉, as a function of b for p = 0
(stars) and p = 0.10 (squares). The effect of the social plas-
ticity is that the Defectors get a larger payoff on average:
〈ΠD − ΠC〉 is positive for p 6= 0. Inset: probability distribu-
tion (normalized to each sub-population) of individual payoff,
for Cooperators (solid line) and Defectors (dotted line). The
most probable payoff, which corresponds to the maximum of
the distribution, is larger for Defectors than for Cooperators.
However, there are a few Cooperators getting the largest pay-
off in the population as it is seen in the tails of the distribution
for large values of Π. Parameter values b = 1.75, p = 0.1.
and thus
dfC
dt
= fC(1− fC)((R − T )fC + (S − P )(1 − fC)) . (4)
The analysis of this equation indicates that it has two
equilibrium solutions in fC ∈ [0, 1]: fC = 0 is a sta-
ble fixed point, while fC = 1 is an unstable fixed point.
Thus, it also follows from this dynamical analysis that
in the absence of an interaction network describing a so-
cial structure the only stable solution is a pure defective
state.
In the spatial version of the PD (Axelrod, 1984;
Nowak and May, 1992, 1993; Nowak et al., 1994a,b)
agents sit on the nodes of the network and they play
the game with their neighbors. Two agents are said
to be ‘neighbors’ if they are directly connected by a
link of the network. A detailed analysis of the differ-
ent spatiotemporal patterns that can arise in the dy-
namics shows a phase space where Cooperators and De-
fectors can coexist depending on the parameter values
((Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994; Schweitzer et al., 2002)).
There are threshold values in parameter space beyond
which defection dominates the whole network.
We will consider a spatial version of the PD, general-
ized in order to consider, instead of fixed, regular lattices,
adapting evolving networks of interaction.
A. Social plasticity
We want to study how the results obtained with fixed
interaction networks change if certain social plasticity is
allowed. This term addresses the common observation
that social interactions in most societies adapt in time
by a learning process. We will implement a rule for so-
cial plasticity which depends on both the strategies and
pay-off of the individual players. The motivation of this
rule comes from the following analysis of the mutual ben-
efit obtained from each pair of allowed PD interactions:
two symmetric (C–C and D–D) and one asymmetric (C–
D). Clearly the symmetric interaction C–C should be re-
inforced because both agents get the maximum payoff
from their selected strategies. However, the opposite oc-
curs in a D–D interaction, where both agents have aligned
incentives to change neighbor and to possibly find a C-
neighbor. The asymmetric interaction C–D forms an in-
termediate class, where the C agent will not support the
interaction, but the D agent will try to reinforce it. As a
first approximation to the problem, we assume that this
type of interaction does not change, because the over-
all effect of both agents is balanced. From this analysis,
we conclude that the simplest non-trivial social plastic-
ity rule should allow interactions among two D-agents
to adapt, providing a self-interest mechanism of social
adaptation where the agents can increase their payoffs
by changing their partners.
B. The model
We consider a fixed population of agents placed in the
nodes of a network and connected by links to their neigh-
bors. The dynamics evolves in discrete time steps divided
in three stages, starting from a random choice of strate-
gies and a random network:
1. Interacting: Each agent i plays the PD game with
its neighbors, and collects an aggregate payoff Πi;
2. Strategy update: Each agent updates its current
strategy, imitating the strategy of the neighbor
with the largest payoff including himself (whenever
more than one equivalent neighbor with a larger
payoff exists, one of them is randomly selected);
3. Neighborhood update: If agent i imitates a Defector,
then the agent i replaces with probability p this
link with the imitated D-neighbor by a new one
pointing to a randomly chosen partner from the
whole network. This process updates the network.
In order to clarify the rules of the model we would
like to remark the following points. First, we spec-
ify that in the interaction step we only consider bidi-
rectional (undirected) links, so if agent i plays with
j then we also assume that j plays with i. Second,
we do not consider complex strategies which involve
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FIG. 5: Time series for the fraction of Cooperators fC for
b = 1.7. The evolution is in a fixed random network (p = 0)
up to time t = 200 when network dynamics is switched-on,
so that p = 1 for t > 200. At time t = 500 the network
leader is forced to change action from C to D, to show how
cooperation may recover after a social crisis. After an oscil-
latory transient, a new stationary state is reached. Below,
snapshots of the instantaneous configurations of actions are
shown at the indicated times. A white (black) point is a C
(D) agent in a node of the network (links are not shown). The
spatial location of the agents does not have any meaning due
to the building of a network of interactions. It is only used
for displaying purposes.
the history of past encounters with neighbors (as in
Lindgren and Nordahl (1994)), but we consider instead
only zero-memory strategies, and assume that each agent
plays the same strategy (action) C or D with all its part-
ners. Third, the game is played synchronously, i.e., at
each discrete time step agents decide their strategy in
advance and they all play at the same time.
We consider in Fig. 1 an example that illustrates the
rules of the model. The system is initially formed by
5 Cooperators (agents a to e) and 1 Defector (agent f).
According to the payoff they obtain, agents a, d and e are
unsatisfied and they will imitate in the next time step the
Cooperator c. Agents c and f are satisfied because they
don’t have a neighbor with a larger payoff. Finally agent
b is also unsatisfied but the agent with largest payoff is
the Defector f . Thus in the next time step it changes its
strategy to become a Defector, and (with probability p)
breaks the link with agent f and selects a new neighbor
as partner (in this case he selects agent a). Note that
in the neighborhood update rule it is not needed that an
agent changes its strategy from Cooperator to Defector to
severe a link. This example shows that the neighborhood
update rule facilitates the survival of the Defectors by
increasing their payoff when a Cooperator is selected at
random.
The strategy and neighborhood update rules imple-
mented in this model represent a useful choice to un-
veil basic mechanisms behind global cooperative behav-
ior. Other choices are discussed later in Section 4. On
the one hand, the extreme learning (imitation) rule of
the strategy update can be justified by the psychological
bias to focus on confirmation and neglect disconfirmation
of believes (Strang and Macy, 2001). Bounded rational
agents seek to learn from limited and biased information:
they respond to perceived failure by imitating their most
successful peer. In our case example of scientific collab-
orations, each scientist takes as a model to imitate the
most successful among his collaborators rather than, for
example, alternating in imitating some of them.
Regarding the neighborhood update rule, we assume
first that only D–D links are broken, and second that any
targeted agent always accepts a new partner. This rule
can be justified as a conservative assumption when con-
sidering minimal conditions for the emergence of coopera-
tion. As discussed in Section 4, alternative rules allowing
Cooperators to severe their links would further enhance
cooperation. The second assumption can be justified in-
voking the absence of cost to sustain a link. Within this
assumption, the new link may only increase the payoff,
never decrease it, thus it will always be accepted. In the
context of scientific collaboration, if the cost to sustain a
research collaboration was zero, then scientists would ac-
cept offers from any collaborator with the expectation to
get a benefit. Beyond sustaining a link, there is a cost to
establish a new on. In our model, the plasticity parame-
ter p measures how easy is both to severe a collaboration
and find a new partner. While for p = 0 this cost is ex-
tremely large (so large that it prevents the formation of
new links), for p = 1 the cost is small.
Finally, although in real social dynamics one experi-
ences both spontaneous creation and suppression of in-
teractions, for simplicity, our model assumes that unsuc-
cessful relations are replaced by randomly selected new
ones, leaving always the total number of links constant.
Our strategy update introduces a first classification
of the agents in the network: satisfied and unsatisfied
agents. An agent is satisfied if he does not imitate any
other agent, so he has the largest payoff in its neighbor-
hood; otherwise he is unsatisfied. Thus, strategy imita-
tion and social plasticity (adaptation) is restricted only
to unsatisfied agents.
The probability p measures the social plasticity of the
agents, controlling the rate at which the network struc-
ture evolves, as compared to the time scale of evolution
of the strategies. For values of p ≪ 1 strategies change
much faster than network evolution (situation close to the
frozen network of p = 0), while for p = 1 strategies and
network evolve at the same rate (fluid social network).
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FIG. 6: Normalized standard deviation σn of the degree dis-
tribution of the social networks obtained for different values
of the plasticity parameter p and the incentive to defect b. For
a Poisson distribution and K = 8, σn = K
−0.5 = 0.35, while
for an exponential distribution σn = 1. For p = 0, σn takes
the value of a Poisson distribution. As p and b are increased
the interaction network departs from a Poisson distribution
and approaches a distribution with an exponential tail.
C. Stationary states
The proposed model naturally leads to a time evolution
of the local connectivity of the network, featuring agents
with heterogeneous neighborhoods. Starting from ini-
tial condition of random partnership with links randomly
placed among initially equivalent agents, the feedback be-
tween choice of strategies and choice of partners results
in a dynamical evolution from which a well-defined social
structure is expected to emerge in the form of stationary
states.
In our context a stationary state is reached when both
the strategy of each agent and its neighbors remain fixed
in time. Given the discrete nature of the dynamics and
the finite number of possible states, these states may be
reached in a finite number of time steps. The simplest
stationary state consists of all agents being Cooperators.
Note however, that a state composed exclusively by De-
fectors is a stationary state only when the network is
fixed (p = 0); for p > 0, the agents strategies remain
fixed, while the network is continuously evolving. Ac-
cording to the dynamical rules of the model, each agent
being a Defector is not a stationary configuration, even
in the case of a social network where each agent has the
same number of neighbors (remember than in the case of
several neighbors sharing the largest payoff in the neigh-
borhood one of them is picked at random). In an all-D
network only interaction links change, but not strate-
gies. For the sake of clarity we will refer to this state
as the all-D network state, even if the interactions are
not stationary. Our system has a multiplicity of differ-
ent stationary states and it is expected that the system
reaches one of these states. This assumption is confirmed
by numerical simulations. The specific stationary state
reached by the system depends on the stochastic process
that shapes the network evolution. A proper characteri-
zation of the general properties of these stationary states
relies then on statistical tools.
Two requirements are needed for a stationary state to
exist. The first is that there are no links between two
Defectors, so that the neighborhood update rule (p >
0) does not produce any change. The second condition
relates the respective payoffs in each neighborhood of any
Cooperator i interacting with a D-agent, say d. Their
respective payoffs must satisfy
Πj > Πd > Πi , (5)
where agent j is the Cooperator imitated by i. Thus, a
stable situation occurs when the payoff of Defectors ac-
commodate ’in-between’ the payoff of two Cooperators,
and they only exploit Cooperators. Whenever the payoff
of d becomes larger than the best neighbor of i, the con-
figuration is no longer stationary, because the Cooperator
i will switch to imitate the strategy of agent d. Thus, in
the stationary state, Defectors do not interact with other
D-agents, and no Cooperator imitates their strategy. An
interesting consequence of this result is that the agent
with the largest payoff is a Cooperator, if the system set-
tles to a stationary state. However, this does not prevent
that in a transient state a Defector can hold the largest
payoff.
This simple analysis highlights the role that the ‘imita-
tion of the best neighbor’, coupled to the social plasticity
rule, has in shaping the social structure of the system. A
related consequence is that the social structure developed
becomes hierarchical in terms of payoff and in terms of
the dynamics as we will show below. One way to visualize
the hierarchal structure of the network is by construct-
ing a sub-network referred as imitation network, where
each directed link indicates who is imitating whom. As
in stationary states no other agent imitates Defectors, in
this representation, D-agents are isolated.
Figure 2 shows part of the imitation network in a sta-
tionary configuration. The agents in the outer layers im-
itate the ones in the inner layers: by our previous defi-
nition they are unsatisfied agents. In a stationary state,
Cooperators form trees of agents hierarchically ordered
according to their payoff. This description highlights
some special agents that do not imitate any other agent:
the agent in the top of the chain has the highest payoff of
the tree it belongs and he is the only agent that is satis-
fied in the tree. They are easily recognized at the top of
the trees. All other agents in the tree are unsatisfied, but
they imitate the same strategy they were playing in the
previous time step. An implication of this representation
is that the size of the group formed by following directed
links to the leader, gives an indication of the influence of
the leader with respect to the rest of the system. In a sta-
tionary state, a leader has no links to D agents. Among
the leaders there is an absolute leader defined as the one
with the largest payoff in the system. As a consequence
it is also the agent with the largest number of links in the
imitation network. All the links of the absolute leader are
9imitation links shown in the imitation network; any other
leader in the system has a smaller number of cooperat-
ing partners. The whole system is dominated by the few
leaders that control a large fraction of the population.
The structure of the social network is then expected to
be very sensitive to perturbations acting on those leaders.
When the system is close to a stationary state (i.e.,
if there are a few Cooperators not satisfying Eq. (5), as
it happens when, for example, a Cooperator imitates a
Defector), then the imitation network is useful to under-
stand how this ’perturbation’ will propagate along the
rest of the social structure. Note that at each time step,
the D strategy replicates on all those agents connected
to the agent where the perturbation started, causing an
’avalanche’ of replication events. This chain of events
may end in a all-D network or due to the existence of
Cooperator leaders, cooperation may recover, as we will
show below.
D. Social differentiation
Our previous description of the resulting stationary
states, offers also a description of how our social model
with network adaptation naturally gives rise to a process
of social differentiation, with the spontaneous emergence
of different social roles. Even if all the agents are driven
by the same dynamical rules and they are initially sta-
tistically equivalent, their role in the network diversifies.
Our previous analysis of the imitation network allows us
to identify three types of agents in a stationary state:
• Leaders: satisfied Cooperators that have the max-
imum payoff in their corresponding neighborhood.
The absolute leader is the agent with the largest
payoff in the whole network, and its corresponding
group of influenced agents is in general the largest.
Typically the other leaders have also a large num-
ber of links and a payoff above the average. Admit-
tedly, the sociological concept of leader has several
different characteristics, not all of them included
in our definition. Still we use this term to empha-
size that those are agents strongly influencing other
agents to adopt their strategy. In this context lead-
ers do not have the will of seeking their leadership
nor do they try to preserve it.
• Conformists: unsatisfied Cooperators, i.e. they do
not have the maximum payoff in their neighbor-
hood, but they imitate another agent playing their
same strategy. They constitute the large majority
of the nodes of the imitation network except for the
leaders.
• Exploiters: Defectors who take advantage of other’s
actions. Defectors have a larger payoff than their
(C) neighbors, showing they succeed in exploita-
tion, and are satisfied. In the imitation network
they do not have any directed link, because in the
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FIG. 7: Normalized clustering coefficient, c/crand, with
crand = K/N . Filled circles correspond to p = 1 and q = 0.
Other curves are for q = 0.01 and p = 0.01 (diamonds),
p = 0.1 (squares), and p = 1 (empty circles). Social plas-
ticity (p 6= 0) and a local selection of new partners (q 6= 0) is
needed in order to reproduce the clustering observed in social
networks.
stationary state no other agent imitates their strat-
egy.
III. SIMULATING SOCIAL DYNAMICS
To facilitate comparison with previous results of the
PD game in fixed networks (e.g.., (Nowak and May,
1992)), we have performed numerical simulations of the
above model using as main parameters the incentive to
defect b ≡ T in the range 1 < b < 2 and the social plas-
ticity p ∈ [0, 1]. The rest of the PD payoff matrix param-
eters have been kept fixed, R = 1, P = 0, and S = 0 as
in Nowak and May (1992). It has been previously found
(Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994) that turning P = S = 0
does not change the main results, although the single PD
game is not in the strict Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions.
We have checked that changing the parameter P in the
region (0, 0.1) does not affect significantly our results.
All simulations were performed with N = 10000
agents. The strategy initial condition was always set to
60% of randomly distributed Cooperators. The network
initial condition was set by distributingKN/2 undirected
links between random pairs of nodes. The numberK cor-
responds to the average connectivity per agent, and we
considered K = 8. The initial degree (number of links
of each agent) distribution constructed in this manner is
a Poisson distribution with parameter K. Simulations
with other values parameters have been performed and
no qualitative differences were found. Likewise we have
checked that using an asynchronous updating in our sim-
ulations does not change any meaningful qualitative re-
sult. For the above parameters, a stationary state is
reached in a time scale that depends very much on p,
requiring about a 1000 time steps for p = 0.01 and about
10 time steps for p = 1. For smaller N the typical time
to reach a stationary state decreases, while for larger K
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it takes longer time. A proper characterization of the
general properties of these stationary states relies then
on averaging over many different numerical experiments.
Our results are given as averages over 100 different ex-
periments.
Simulations in our adaptive dynamic network game
show how Cooperation is in general enhanced and no
threshold to an all-D network is observed. In fact, our
results indicate that for a given set of parameters, there
is a coexistence of a multitude of cooperative stationary
states and the all-D network state. This means that for a
fraction of the initial conditions, the stochastic dynamics
of the network may lead either to the all-D network, or
to a stationary state. Once in the all-D network, the sys-
tem gets trapped and no recovery is possible (remember
that an in all-D state the interaction links change, but
not strategies). The probability of reaching the trapping
all D-network, decreases with increasing the number of
agents (it also decreases with decreasing the incentive to
defect b and increasing the initial distribution of Coop-
erators), and thus the trap appears to be a finite size
effect. For instance, for an incentive to defect b = 1.6
and plasticity p = 0.01, only 6% of the realizations get
trapped for a large population of N = 10000, while in
contrast for N = 1000, 80% get trapped. Here we con-
centrate on stationary states where Cooperators coexist
with Defectors.
A. Fraction of Cooperators
Figure 3 shows a first global characterization of the sta-
tionary states, for different values of the parameter p and
the incentive to defect b. The fraction of Cooperators,
fC , is measured for a fixed network (p = 0) and is shown
to decreases with b, approaching 0 at a threshold value
of b ≃ 1.75. Thus context preservation (Cohen et al.,
2001) without social plasticity provides partial cooper-
ation. In clear contrast, for positive p, social plasticity
facilitates the establishment of a highly cooperative state
with a fraction of Cooperators essentially independent of
the incentive to defect b. Even for small plasticity p,
the fraction of Cooperators is above 90% in the range of
parameter b considered. A similar result is obtained for
other values of the average connectivity K > 2. In this
sense, context preservation is not a necessary condition
to build up cooperation, but rather the social structure
is a consequence of an adaptive dynamics in which coop-
eration is greatly enhanced.
It is worth mentioning that the result of enhanced co-
operation works against the direct effects of the neighbor-
hood adaptation rule, introduced to facilitate the survival
of Defectors. Defectors are allowed to find new Cooper-
ators to exploit, exiting from unsatisfactory interactions
with other Defectors. However, the final outcome is that
the number of Defectors decreases. It seems that suc-
cessful Defectors become isolated because they are role
models: their victims “run away”. The new Defectors –
those that imitated a successful Defectors– establish links
with some Cooperators who have a high concentration of
some other Cooperators in their neighborhoods. Thus
the formerly exploited Cooperators, now Defectors, turn
again into Cooperators. What it is needed to get cooper-
ation is Cooperators with enough Cooperator partners to
have a payoff higher than any Defector. This hypothesis
is analyzed in the following sections.
B. Distribution of Cooperators’ and Defectors’
payoffs
The total average payoff is larger in the dynamic net-
work (p 6= 0) than for a frozen network (p = 0). However,
we have measured systematic differences when consider-
ing the average payoffs ΠD and ΠC , for each of the re-
spective sub-populations D and C. While the number of
Cooperators is larger, their average payoff is smaller than
the one of the Defectors, reversing the situation of what
happens in a frozen network (see Fig. 4). The payoff dis-
tribution in a stationary state for each subpopulation is
shown in the inset of Fig. 4 for a particular value of b.
This graph shows that the most probable payoff is larger
for Defectors, explaining also the larger average payoff
of the Defectors. However, close inspection reveals that
the distribution for Cooperators has always a larger tail,
indicating that there is a number of Cooperators with
a payoff larger than any other Defector in the network.
Most of these agents belong to the class of the leaders,
and are necessary for a cooperative stationary state to
exist.
Thus the main characteristics of our adaptive social
game, is that an altruistic social network, i.e., a network
composed by a large fraction of Cooperators, may de-
velop with few Defectors but which have a larger aver-
age payoff. The neighborhoods of the agents adapt to
conform the requirements of the stationary states (D-
agents only interact with Cooperators), and the Cooper-
ator with a largest payoff in each branch of the imitation
network corresponds to a ‘leader’, with a payoff much
larger than the average, from which all other agents im-
itate its strategy.
C. Transient dynamics, leaders and social crisis
The evolution towards a stationary state is typically
not a smooth monotonous build-up of a globally cooper-
ating state. Starting from a random initial condition, the
transient dynamics is characterized by small fluctuations
and some distinctive large oscillations in the fraction of
Cooperators as a function of time, that can be under-
stood in terms of social crisis.
An example of the frustrated attempts to built coop-
eration is given by the evolution of the fraction of Coop-
erators shown in Fig. 5. Starting from a non-stationary
state of low cooperation in the initial fixed random net-
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work for t < 200, network dynamics then leads to a social
network with a high degree of cooperation after several
large oscillations in the time interval 220 < t < 300. The
large oscillations in fC are frustrated attempts to build
cooperation. This indicates that the defecting behavior
is so rewarding, that the cooperation has to find a spe-
cific network configuration in order to be robust against
eventual changes of strategy. In such configuration the
most connected agent (largest number of links) in the im-
itation network is also the one with largest payoff. In the
frustrated attempts to reach a global stationary cooper-
ative state, the fraction of Cooperators becomes large.
A few time steps before fC reaches each maxima, a Co-
operator receives a new link from a Defector with larger
payoff, and switches to D-strategy, starting a social crisis.
Given that at those time steps there is a large propor-
tion of Cooperators in the network, a fast avalanche of
imitation of D-strategy starts. This imitation will cer-
tainly affect the neighbors of a Cooperator leader, thus
decreasing the payoff of most leaders. Precisely when
an avalanche starts, there is a Defector with a payoff
larger than the absolute Cooperative leader. The social
crisis propagates through most of the system, produc-
ing a change in the connectivity of the social network
(Zimmermann et al (2001)). The initial distribution of
the number of links for the C and D populations are Pois-
son distributions around the average connectivity, typical
of random networks. At the time of a local maximum of
fC the two distributions have exponential tails for large
values of the number of links. Then very rapidly after
a local maximum of fC , the network switches to the al-
most defective solution with a large number of D–D links
and Poissonian degree distributions. However the exis-
tence of a small number of Cooperators with a large pay-
off permits, thanks to the plasticity of the network, the
gradual build-up of cooperation by creating C–C links.
This requires two steps. First D–C links are created (ini-
tiated by the Defectors) and then the Defectors imitate
the more successful Cooperator in a later stage. Finally
in the stationary state, the distribution of the number of
links for the D population becomes very narrow, while
the distribution for the C population displays a tail ap-
proaching an exponential decay. The stationary network
configuration is thus dominated by a few Cooperators –
the leaders– with a large number of links (the tails of
the distribution of the number of links for Cooperators).
These highly connected agents dominate the collective
behavior of the network.
This characteristic dynamics reveals the functional
property of C-leaders; on one hand, due to the imita-
tion process they sustain cooperation, while on the other
they enhance cooperation whenever the C-leader has the
largest payoff of the whole network. In fact there is a
sort of competition between the Cooperative leader and
the Defector with largest payoff. We remark that the
latter process is due to the social plasticity: whenever a
Defector selects a leader for partnership, there is a large
probability that it has a larger payoff and the Defector
will imitate cooperation, enhancing the number of Coop-
erators.
Figure 5 also illustrates the sensitivity of the station-
ary network structure to exogenous perturbations acting
on the leaders, which reflects their key role in sustain-
ing cooperation. At time t = 500, the system already
reached a stationary state. However, at this time step,
we have forced a strategy switch of the cooperative ab-
solute leader, leading once again to a social crisis similar
than the previously described in the endogenous dynam-
ics. In summary, the system self-organizes itself in one
of several possible cooperative states where avalanches
and social crisis are likely to occur following spontaneous
focused local perturbations.
D. Structure of the social network
A first characterization of the topology of the station-
ary network reached by the dynamics is given by the
degree distribution, i.e., the probability distribution of
the number K of links of a node. This distribution has
a long tail that distinguishes it from the Poisson distri-
bution of the random network. This is reflected in the
values of the normalized standard deviation σn = σ/K
shown in Fig. 6 for different values of p and b. We recall
that for a Poisson distribution σn = K
−1/2, while for an
exponential distribution σn = 1. We find that for small
values of b the distribution departs significantly from the
Poisson distribution only for large values of the plasticity
parameter p, while for increasing b the tail of the distri-
bution expands and approaches an exponential form. In
other words, the hierarchical structure of the network ac-
centuates as b increases, with fewer leaders that have a
larger payoff.
The distribution of payoffs (inset of Fig. 4) is simi-
lar to the degree distribution, because the payoff of the
Cooperators is given by the number of links with other
Cooperators, and there is a very small number of De-
fectors in the stationary state. Therefore, the variations
of σn also provide a measure of social inequality in the
network. In fact σn is closely related to the Gini coef-
ficient (Kakwani, 1980) used in the characterization of
economic inequalities in a social group. We have mea-
sured the Gini coefficient of the resulting network con-
figuration in a stationary state, and found that it can
be twice as large compared to a random (Poissonian dis-
tribution) network. Social plasticity generates a flux of
payoff towards richer individuals.
Finally, we address the question of whether the social
structure generated in our dynamical model has the char-
acteristics of Small World network. Two requirements
have to be fulfilled: the clustering (or cliquishness) has
to be much larger than in a random network, and the
average path length between two nodes should be similar
to the one of a corresponding random network. The clus-
tering coefficient, c, measures the fraction of neighbors of
a node that are connected among them, averaged over all
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the nodes in the network. Most real complex networks
show a clustering larger than in random networks given
by crand = K/N (Amaral et al., 2000). In our original
formulation, numerical simulations show (Fig. 7) that
for increasing b the clustering coefficient increases very
mildly with respect to the clustering of a fixed random
network (i.e. c/crand may change up to 1.06). We have
tested a slight enhancement of the network adaptation,
which easily accounts for high clustering. Very often, new
acquaintances are made based on the relationships of cur-
rent neighbors. To implement this idea, the social neigh-
borhood adaptation step of our original formulation was
augmented: if a neighbor is replaced by a new one, with
probability q a local selection of a new partner is done
among the neighbors of the neighbors, while with prob-
ability 1− q the previous random selection is performed.
The limiting case q = 0, corresponds to our original for-
mulation, while q = 1 corresponds to the case that all
the new partners are chosen from the neighbor’s neigh-
bors. It is natural that this new mechanism will increase
the clustering. Numerical simulations show that while
most of our results previously discussed are qualitatively
independent of the value of q, with a very small value
of q the clustering coefficient reaches a very large value.
For instance, 1% of local partner selection is enough to
increase c a hundred times, being the clustering largest
for a slow evolution of the network (p≪ 1). For the sec-
ond requirement for small world topology, we find that
the average path length remains in all cases very close to
the one of a random network. All together our results
indicate that allowing for local partner selection, the so-
cial network generated in our adaptive dynamics has the
structure of a small world network.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have presented a minimal model which incorpo-
rates simultaneous and coupled evolution (co-evolution)
of the strategies of the agents and of the social network,
providing a first step in the investigation of the processes
of social differentiation in a globally cooperating social
group. Different agents end up playing different social
roles. These roles are acquired through social interac-
tion and they are not externally imposed or determined
by genetic mechanisms. Rather, the roles emerge from
the self-organizing dynamics of the complex system. It is
here important to note that the initial differences in num-
ber of links among the agents do not determine the final
role of each agent, since each agent changes temporarily
its role in the stochastic dynamics until a final stationary
state is reached. Moreover, we have checked that taking
as initial condition a random network in which each agent
has the same number of links, the system dynamics leads
to the same emergent role differentiation.
Our results indicate that cooperation is stabilized by a
hierarchical self-organized structure, so that the forma-
tion of cohesive clusters of Cooperators with exclusion
of free riders is not needed for persistent global coop-
eration. Allowing for some local partner selection, this
self-organization leads from a random network to a fi-
nal social network with the topology of a Small World
network, giving an example of how the small world con-
nectivity, in which clustering is larger than in a random
network, can be dynamically achieved.
Our study reveals that if Defectors have the ability to
choose partners, breaking interactions with other Defec-
tors, the number of Cooperators increases, but the av-
erage payoff of Cooperators is less than that of greedy
agents. The dynamics naturally generates leaders -
individuals getting a large payoff who are imitated by
a considerable fraction of the population-, conformists
-unsatisfied cooperative agents that keep cooperating-,
and exploiters -Defectors with a payoff larger than the
average one obtained by Cooperators. The most promi-
nent role is the one of leader, a Cooperator which not only
sustains cooperation, but, it also drives the whole system
towards more cooperation. Defectors are found to remain
in a stable situation whenever they exploit Cooperators.
The formation of a social hierarchy in the population is
the source of possible unstable behavior. It promotes the
occurrence of social crisis that can affect a large fraction
of the population. These crisis take the form of global
cascades that might be easily triggered by the sponta-
neous change of the action of a highly connected agent.
This result identifies the importance of highly-connected
agents that, as illustrated by the imitation network, play
a leadership role in the collective dynamics of the system.
Such sensitivity of the network stability to local special
perturbations provides an interesting feature of global-
ization: the group of agents organizes itself in a state
where an exogenous or stochastic perturbation may pro-
duce drastic changes, at distance, in a finite time.
Even though our model shows many interesting as-
pects, the strategy and neighborhood update rules repre-
sent an extreme and conservative choice of rules. Thus, it
would be important to investigate how the modification
of the model rules affect the results reported here. Some
of the points that we consider that merit further research
in connection with our strategy update and network up-
date rules are indicated in the remainder.
Starting with our strategy update rule, we note that
an important assumption made in our model is that the
satisfaction of an agent is determined by comparison of
absolute payoffs. Due to the evolution of the social inter-
action this implies that two neighbors might have differ-
ent payoff just because they have a different number of
neighbors. On the one hand this incorporates the idea of
the importance of being highly connected. On the other
hand, the possibility of using a comparison based on the
relative payoff per neighbor would imply that each agent
knows how many neighbors has each of its neighbors. Ad-
ditionally, our strategy update rule is an extreme “copy
best” rule, while alternatives of probabilistic imitation of
better role models (Schlag and Pollock, 1999), or proba-
bilistic selection of neighbors strategy (Nowak and May,
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1993) could also be considered.
Turning now to the network update rule, we note that
in our model only links between two Defectors can be pos-
sibly broken. In a stationary state most Cooperators are
unsatisfied because they imitate an agent with a larger
payoff. In our model this unsatisfactory situation does
not induce an action to improve their payoff beyond the
imitation of a neighbor in the social network. One way
to test the implications of this hypothesis would be mod-
ifying the network update rule, letting the C-D link also
to be broken, for example letting Cooperators have some
probability to change a D-neighbor by a random agent. It
is clear that in this setting cooperation would be further
enhanced, and it could also limit the occurrence of large
social crisis. Thus, our rule for neighborhood update
assures that particularly the highly successful Defectors
won’t be abandoned by the Cooperators whose exploita-
tion has made them so successful. Hence, we make De-
fection an attractive role model because exploited agents
can not simply leave their exploiter, e.g., due to costs of
relationship change, or some (semi-)rational calculation
of the expected benefit of creating new ties. A related
point is that one could question why not all D-D links
have the possibility of being broken and not only those
that involve an unsatisfied agent. We have in fact consid-
ered that only agents having at least one neighbor with
higher payoff, are “forced” to do something to improve
their payoff. Thus, we assume some kind of “aversion to
change”: do something only when you are not satisfied,
otherwise do nothing. This rule can be justified invoking
some cost implicit in the change of a social relation, and
it allows, in principle, to keep the interaction between
two Defectors as long as they are satisfied.
There is another point which deserves further investi-
gation and which relates both to the strategy and net-
work update rules: Our choice of strategy update is based
on the aggregate payoff, while our justification of the net-
work adaptation rule is based on comparison of individ-
ual actions. This a priori involves two different mecha-
nisms and it is clear that our choice is one among sev-
eral possible. We have already mentioned a strategy up-
date (Nowak and May, 1993) based on probabilistic se-
lection among the neighbors strategy, weighted by the
aggregate payoff. Cohen et al. (2001) compares differ-
ent such mechanisms on fixed networks. On the other
hand, fewer results are known on network update mech-
anisms. In the economics literature a common choice
is that a link among two economic agents is accepted if
both agents improve their payoff (Bala and Goyal, 2000;
Jackson and Watts, 2002). It would be interesting to test
new strategy and network adaptations involving a more
sophisticated evaluation of the strategy of the opponent
and its aggregate payoff. One possible direction is to
contemplate a more complex strategy space, involving
strategies dependent on the past encounters. Work in
this direction with fixed social network was initiated by
Lindgren and Nordahl (1994). Another interesting direc-
tion is to consider non-equivalent agents, so that they
may differ in their attractiveness as exchange partners.
Flache (2001) has incorporated this situation in a model
that combines the agents’ decisions about cooperation
with the decisions about selection of new partners. They
also obtain a process of social differentiation sustaining
cooperation. It is unclear how much of the process of so-
cial differentiation originates in the unequally attractive
agents or on the simpler mechanisms contained in our
model.
Beyond our update rules, the addition of random per-
turbations in strategy and network is also a very relevant
feature to be explored in the future. These perturbations
may originate from errors in imitation or payoff determi-
nation, for example. Here we have just shown that strat-
egy perturbations may cause large social crisis, specially
if a well connected agent makes an error.
We finally remark that many contexts in human soci-
eties follow the dynamic scheme considered here – new
collaborations are frequently formed, while other long
lasting partnerships die out. From scientific collaboration
to sports teams –political parties not to be forgotten–
, our study offers an example of simple mechanism by
which leadership, and also other social roles, might ap-
pear and consolidate.
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